





The Triumph of Finitude After Hegel  
and the (Re)turn1  of a Philosophy  
of the Infinite through Badiou 
 
Philosophy . . . starts off from life, . . . and ends up at life.  
What does the epoch in which we live give us? What is this epoch?  
What things have value therein? What things don’t? Philosophy proposes  
a sorting procedure amid the confusion of experience, from which  
it draws an orientation. This elevation of confusion to orientation is the  
philosophical operation par excellence and its specific didactics. 
- Alain Badiou2 
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In his first Manifesto for Philosophy, Alain Badiou alludes to the idea of 
sutures occurring between philosophy and the more dominant 
disciplines like science, politics, art, and psychoanalysis after Hegel. This 
phenomenon is inextricably linked to discourses about the end of 
philosophy and the linguistic turn in hermeneutic, analytic, and  
 
 
1 The rendering of the term return as (re)turn is adopted from Norman Madarasz’s rendering 
of it in Badiou’s Manifesto for Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). 
2 Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, Philosophy and the Event, trans. Louise Burchill (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2013), 129. 
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postmodern philosophies. In Badiou’s analysis one finds that in so far as 
these traditions are concerned, systematic philosophy is henceforth 
impossible. 
In this work, I take Badiou’s said allusion seriously and argue that after 
totalitarianism and the two world wars, an antipathy towards systematic 
philosophy has led to what I call the triumph of finitude after Hegel in 
which the philosophical orientation not only shifted from truth to 
meaning, but also from the metaphysical to the finite. 
However, in the eyes of Badiou, a philosophy of finitude is unable to 
confront the challenges to thinking posed by the contemporary world. 
He thus proposes the return to a philosophy of truth. Taking note of this, 
I argue that Badiou seeks to replicate in philosophy what Hegel did in 
metaphysics after Kant. 
 
Key terms Alain Badiou, (re)turn of philosophy, contemporary philosophy, 
end of philosophy, linguistic turn 
 
 
omething did happen to (or in) philosophy after Hegel.”3 
This declaration is what Alenka Zupančič draws from 
Badiou’s statement in his first Manifesto for Philosophy about the rise of 
antiphilosophical discourses and the promotion of other fields of 
study at the expense of philosophy, since Hegel.4 In the said work 




3 Alenka Zupančič, “The Fifth Condition,” Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, 
ed. Peter Hallward (London: Continuum, 2004), 191. 
4 Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Norman Madarasz (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 
64. 
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series of sutures with other fields of study, namely: science, political 
thought, art, and psychoanalysis, in the sense that it sought to be 
grafted onto these established activities.5 In his eyes this phenomenon 
gave the impression that “philosophy no longer knows whether it has a 
suitable place.”6 That the dominant philosophical traditions themselves 
declared the end of philosophy made the situation worse. The core 
thesis of this trend was that metaphysics, considered since Aristotle as 
the heart of philosophizing, was no longer possible. A truth-oriented 
philosophy had already been replaced by a meaning-oriented 
philosophy.7 This would later on be called the linguistic turn. 
Meanwhile, twenty years later, Badiou saw that the problem of 
the end of philosophy had been transformed into what he called the 
“artificial existence” of philosophy in the form of “moralizing 
preaching.”8  He remarked that “if, twenty years ago, philosophy, 
forced into ruinous sutures with its conditions of truth, found itself 
asphyxiated by inexistence, philosophy today, chained to 




5  Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 113. Another marked tendency in philosophy was a 
preoccupation with its history—a tendency in philosophy, which Martin Heidegger in his work, 
What is Called Thinking?, had noted and criticized: “There is, of course, serious preoccupation 
everywhere with philosophy and its problems. The learned world is expending commendable 
efforts in the investigation of the history of philosophy. These tasks are useful and worthy, and 
only the best talents are good enough for them, especially when they present to us models of great 
thinking. But even if we have devoted many years to the intensive study of the treatises and 
writings of the great thinkers, that fact is still no guarantee that we ourselves are thinking, or even 
are ready to learn thinking. On the contrary—preoccupation with philosophy more than anything 
else may give us stubborn illusion that we are thinking just because we are incessantly 
‘philosophizing.’” Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: 
Perennial, 2004), 5. 
6 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 113. 
7
 Alain Badiou, “Philosophy and Desire,” in Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, trans. 
and ed. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 2003), 34. 
8
 Alain Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Louise Burchill (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2011), 68. 




existence.”9 This was the problem around which his Second Manifesto 
for Philosophy revolved. Linking this to the first Manifesto, something  
definitely changed in philosophy but something was also retained. 
From antiphilosophical declarations, there was a shift to over-
attributions of moral pronouncements to philosophy.10  But while 
this was the case, the theme of the incommensurability of 
differences remained. However, this time, incommensurability was 
no longer only at the level of language and epistemology, but also at 
the level of culture and ethics. In this sense, I argue that for Badiou, 
philosophy after Hegel not only underwent a linguistic turn, but 
more appropriately, an ethico-linguistic turn. 
In Zupančič’s analysis, the after-Hegel effect in philosophy is 
something that Badiou does not directly address but only hints at. In 
this essay, I take this hint of Badiou seriously. Here, I argue that  
Hegel plays a major role in the radical change in the trajectory taken 
by philosophy in the period after him. Apart from what Badiou 
called the shift from a truth-oriented to a meaning-oriented 
philosophy, I claim that it was also a shift of focus from 
transcendence to finitude. The goal of this essay is to unpack the 
conceptual interrelations involved in this change in the  
transcendental framework of philosophy and to find the place of 
Hegel in this transformation. It is the shift to finitude reflected in 




10 Here, Badiou refers in particular to the ‘new philosophers (nouveaux philosophes)’ for whom 
“only the most elementary form of moralizing preaching qualifies any longer as ‘philosophy’.” 
Badiou further writes that during this time, “[a]ll situations are assessed in terms of the moral 
conduct of their actors, with the number of deaths being the sole yardstick for political endeavours 
and the fight against the ‘bad guys’ the unique ‘Good’ possible to be put forward.  . . .  It is only 
possible to exist as a ‘philosopher’ then, . . . in so far as one uncritically adopts—in the name of 
‘democratic’ dogma the refrain of human rights and our societies’ various customs in respect of 
women, types of punishment or the protection of nature.” Ibid., 68–69. 




interpret Badiou’s call for the (re)turn of philosophy. Hence, this 
work is also an attempt to provide a reading of Badiou’s 
metaphilosophy through the following steps. 
First, I discuss the four sutures of philosophy, followed by the 
discourse about the end of philosophy and the linguistic turn. 
Succeeding this discussion I interpret the linguistic turn as the entry 
point for the ethical shift in philosophy, which I place under the 
heading, “the triumph of finitude” in philosophy. Then I lay out the 
limits of a philosophy centered on finitude using Badiou’s analysis of 
contemporary philosophy’s inability to confront the challenges of 
today’s world. Finally against this backdrop, I situate Badiou’s call 
for the (re)turn of philosophy as a potent idea capable of pushing 
forward the frontiers of philosophizing at this point in time. Pushing 
this argument further, I argue that Badiou does the same brand of 
philosophy that Hegel did in metaphysics after Kant: to put an end 
to the discourse on finitude and reconstruct the concept of truth 
according to the necessities of time. 
The Four Sutures of Philosophy 
In his first Manifesto for Philosophy, Badiou argues that there 
occurred four sutures of philosophy during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. First, there was a double suture to politics and 
science that happened within the period between G. W. F. Hegel 
and Friedrich Nietzsche. Karl Marx, in his eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach, staunchly attacked philosophy: “The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world . . . the point is to change it.”11 Against  
philosophy’s interpretive approach, the declaration of Marx called  
 
 
11  Karl Marx, Thesis 11, “Theses on Feuerbach” in The German Ideology: Including Theses on 
Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998). 




for the world’s revolutionary transformation. For Badiou, the 
interpretive approach signaled not only a political suture but also a 
scientific one since proponents of revolutionary politics wanted to  
raise politics to the rank of science, in the sense of aiming for a 
scientific theory of history, where the laws of dialectics could be 
equally applicable to Nature and History.12 One of the most known 
of such efforts was Joseph Stalin’s version of dialectical materialism.13 
The special attention given to the relationship between science and 
the sociopolitical system was in fact a distinct characteristic of 
Stalin’s revolutionary government.14 Peter Hallward, in his Badiou: A 
Subject to Truth, recounts how Badiou in his later years realized that 
the root cause of the collapse of the communist project was the very 
superimposition of subjective will to the objectivity and necessity of 
history.15 This means that at the heart of the communist movements 
of the nineteenth to twentieth century lay the failure to recognize 
the absolute gap between the subjectivity of the political project and 
the objective development of history. In other words, the very 
inability of communist projects to affirm the constitutive character 
of risk and the contingency of their movement led to their failure. 
Meanwhile, Badiou identifies the positivist movement in 
philosophy as the predominant version of the scientific suture,  
which could be traced back to the inauguration of positive 




12 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 63.  
13 On this account, Badiou argues that it was a materialism that was otherwise still capable of 
totalizing science as it was in the cases wherein Stalin meddled with the legislation of genetics, 
linguistics, and relativist physics. Ibid., 64. 
14 For further information on this, see Alexei B. Kojevnikov’s Stalin’s Great Science: The Times 
and Adventure of Soviet Physicists (History of Modern Physical Sciences) (London: Imperial College Press, 
2004). 
15  Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 40. 




of human intelligence is manifested in the transition from the 
theological paradigm to the positivist or scientific paradigm  
intermediated by the metaphysical paradigm. Such transition is,  
for Comte, the law of human development. Against this backdrop, 
Comte asserts the impossibility of any phenomenon not to enter 
naturally into one of the five great categories of science: 
astronomical, physical, physiological, chemical, and social. The basic 
structure of all phenomena for him must be understood as necessarily 
“subjected to invariable natural Laws,”16 which include those of the 
human mind. For Comte, positive philosophy is “the only rational 
means of exhibiting the logical laws of the human mind.”17 Comte’s 
positive philosophy later on gave birth to positivism as a method in 
sociology and philosophy. Today, the lasting and more pronounced 
effect of this is found in Anglo-Saxon philosophy with Gottlob Frege, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell as the crowned pioneers of 
what is now referred to as Logical Positivism. 18  Under this 
framework, the ‘sense’ and ‘truth’ of statements are assessed 
according to their logical correctness and referential content.19 This  
thought tradition emphatically dismisses the preoccupations of  
 
 
16  Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, vol. 1, trans. Harriet Martineau 
(London: George Bell & Sons, 1896), 5. 
17 Ibid., 35. In this regard, it will not therefore be surprising why Comte considers the very 
possibility of Social Science. Regardless of the difficulty entailed in the task, a science of social 
phenomenon is possible, and in relation to this, there is but the necessity of positive philosophy 
and positive politics to work together to bring about a utopian society. See Auguste Comte’s A 
General View of Positivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
18 This is in distinction to the Sociological Positivism of Comte. 
19 Gottlob Frege would for instance refer to “the truth value of a sentence as constituting its 
reference.” Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” in Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. A.P. 
Martinich and David Sosa, 2nd ed. (UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012), 12. Meanwhile, for 
Bertrand Russell, truth (1) has an opposite, namely falsehood, (2) is a property of beliefs, (3) but it 
is a property of belief only in virtue of its dependence upon the relation of beliefs to outside things. 
Russell writes this in his work The Problems of Philosophy, chapter XII. Ludwig Wittgenstein would 
reinforce this by saying: “A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of 
reality” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, prop. 4.06 in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuinness [London: Routledge Classics, 2001], 27). 




traditional philosophy; as the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would 
say: “Most of the propositions and questions to be found in 
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.”20 
Meanwhile, the drastic effects of the failure of revolutionary 
politics on humankind’s idea of social and political movements, and 
of the possibility of totalizing science and the manipulation of 
technology in the service of totalitarian state projects, resulted in a  
vigilant wariness of sorts toward the possibility of another 
totalitarian regime. The betrayal of the promise of the political and 
scientific revolution in the wake of the modern and industrial age, by 
the catastrophic world wars, state totalitarianism, and the 
destruction and loss of lives that accompanied these developments, 
gave rise to negative sentiments about the projects of enlightenment. 
It brought about repulsion toward the projects of modernity itself. 
This strong aversion to modernity characterizes the two succeeding 
sutures of philosophy that occurred from Nietzsche onwards: the 
artistic and the amorous sutures. 
In response to Soviet totalitarianism and the “machination”21 of 
life in modern science, Martin Heidegger proposed the recourse to 
art, more particularly, to poetry. In his posthumously published 
interview in Der Spiegel, he remarked: “Philosophy will not be able to 
bring about a direct change of the present state of the world . . . the 
only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare readiness, through  
 
 
20 Wittgenstein, prop. 4.003 in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 22. 
21 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 3: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics, trans. David 
Farell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 175. In Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man, one sees 
a radicalization of this idea. Marcuse for instance writes, “the artistic transformation violates the 
natural object, but the violated is itself oppressive; thus the aesthetic transformation is liberation” 
(Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society [London: 
Routledge Classics, 2002], 244). 




thinking and poetry” . . . “Philosophy is at an end.” 22  For  
Heidegger, we do not need philosophy; what we need instead is a 
new thinking. Heidegger saw that the destiny of the metaphysics 
inaugurated by Plato was to culminate in modern science and 
technology. The success of metaphysics embodied in the phrase  
rational man—man going beyond his physical nature through 
reason23—could not but manifest in the very existence of science 
and technology itself: 
Philosophy is metaphysics. . . . Metaphysics is 
Platonism. . . .  The development of philosophy into 
the independent sciences. . . . is the legitimate 
completion of philosophy. Philosophy is ending in the 
present age. It has found its place in the scientific 
attitude of socially active humanity. . . . The end of  
philosophy proves to be the triumph of the 
manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological 
world and of the social order proper to this world.”24 
Heidegger finds in Plato the beginning of the forgottenness of 
Being, and the transformation of man’s understanding of his relation 
with the world or nature as an overcoming, “raising of oneself above  
 
 
22 Martin Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us: The Spiegel Interview (1966)," trans. William 
Richardson in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. T. Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 45–67. 
Available online at http://www.ditext.com/heidegger/interview.html. 
23  Heidegger writes: “Man conceived as the rational animal is the physical exceeding the 
physical”—that is, man raising himself above the animal, the sensual, the physical that he is, 
through reason,—in short: in the nature of man as the rational animal, there is the passing from 
the physical to the non-physical, the supra-physical: thus man himself is the metaphysical” (Martin 
Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, 58). 
24 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in Martin Heidegger: 
Basic Writings from Being and Time to the Task of Thinking (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Thought, 2008), 432–35. 




the physical.” 25  Taking into account the loss of meaning in the  
technological age, the forgetfulness of a reflection directed toward 
what is most worthy of questioning, Heidegger takes the cue from 
Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism and proposed the destruction of 
the history of metaphysics. Under the banner of overcoming 
metaphysics as science, poetry would be the inaugurator of access to 
the originary unconcealedness of Being.26 In this sense the artistic 
suture in philosophy could be said to be the “anti-positivist and anti-
Marxist effort to put philosophy in the hands of the poem.”27 
Meanwhile, many philosophers saw that Heidegger’s ontology 
was not without the metaphysical residues he battled against. I single 
out Emmanuel Levinas as one of the first philosophers to point out 
the limits of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Central to this 
critique was Levinas’s raising anew the Heideggerian formulation of  
the question of metaphysics: Why is there Being rather than 
Nothing? For Levinas, the first and final question must instead be: 
What justifies our right to be? Levinas writes,  
This is the question of the meaning of Being: not the 
ontology of the understanding of that extraordinary 
verb, but the ethics of its justice. The question par 
excellence or the question of philosophy. Not ‘Why 
 
25 Heidegger further writes, “Nowhere are we confronted by a thinking that thinks the truth 
of Being itself and therewith thinks truth itself as Being. This is not thought even where pre-
Platonic thinking, as the beginning of Western thinking, prepares for the unfolding of metaphysics 
in Plato and Aristotle. . . . The history of Being begins, and indeed necessarily, with the forgetting of 
Being” (Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt [New York: Harper Perennial, 1977], 108–9). 
26 This idea is most pronounced in the later works of Heidegger. See Martin Heidegger’s 
Nietzsche Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics; also Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. 
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Perennial, 1975). 
27 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 66. 




Being rather than Nothing?’, but how Being justifies 
itself.28 
This question marks the ethical turn in ontology. What interrupts 
the reduction of “relations between beings to structures of being,”  
the ascent from “the sensation of the particular to knowledge of the 
universal,” from “metaphysics to ontology,” from “the existentiell to 
the existential,” is the Other in his alterity and infinity.29 Our relation 
with the Other—which is immediately a relation of responsibility, an 
ethical relation—is the impasse of the concept: the Other simply 
resists representation.30 In our contemporary world this resistance is 
manifested in ethical pronouncements about the respect of 
differences, multiculturalism, and the politics of tolerance, which 
readily find translation in the core values of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, viz., freedom, equality, and 
brotherhood.31 The ethical turn could be read in this sense as the  
promotion of the love of humanity founded on the principle of 
alterity and infinity. This is the amorous suture of philosophy.32 
 
28  Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader ed. Sean Hand 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 86. 
29  Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?,” in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical 
Writings (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 5–6. 
30 Ibid., 7. 
31  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is available online at http://www.un.org/ 
en/documents/udhr/. 
32 The singling out of Levinas supplements Badiou’s allusion to Levinas when talking about 
the amorous suture in philosophy in his first Manifesto. In reading Badiou, I recognized that in 
instances where he talks about the ethics of differences and ethics of compassion a he highlights 
the idea of the widespread promotion for the ‘love for humanity.’ This perspective is for Badiou, 
an ideology and should be contrasted with his idea of love as a truth process. He directly criticizes 
the former in his interview article, “On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou, by          
Christopher Cox and Molly Whalen,” Cabinet Magazine Online, Issue 5, Winter 2001/02, 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/articles/on-evil/; and book Ethics: An Essay on the 
Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (New York: Verso, 2000).  




In a similar vein, Theodor Adorno’s negative dialectics could be 
interpreted as advancing an ethics of compassion.33 In his critique of 
metaphysics, Adorno highlights the ethical responsibility imposed 
upon thinking by the horror that was Auschwitz. 34  Adorno 
emphatically reminds us: 
Metaphysics has been changed in its innermost motifs. 
I could, if you like, give this a moral-philosophical twist 
and say that Hitler has placed a new imperative on us: 
that, quite simply, Auschwitz should not be repeated 
and that nothing like it should ever exist again.35 
Philosophy, for it to be possible again, would need to accept its 
guilt.36 This suggestion translates into a call for awareness, a call for a 
response to the threats and events simultaneously occurring around 
the human being, which consists in a reorientation of  
thinking to the materiality of life. The body is not a problem that  
must be overcome through the metaphysical ascent of human reason, 
as Plato and Aristotle put it. Rather, the body is the true foundation of 
being. Ethics is not the quest for the transcendent idea. Ethics is the 
recognition of bodily existence itself. This proposition is what I would 
refer to as the Adornoian response to Levinas’s question of what 
justifies Being, the assertion that: 
 
 
33  The explicit mention of this interpretation could be found in Alain Badiou’s article, 
“Affirmative Dialectics: from Logic to Anthropology,” The International Journal of Badiou 
Studies 2, no.1 (2013): 1–13.  
34 See Paolo Bolaños’s “Philosophy from the Standpoint of Damaged Life: Adorno on the 
Ethical Character of Thinking,” Budhi 16, no.3 (2012): 78–93. 
35
 Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), 116. See also Mark Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
36 Ibid., 113. 




the true basis of morality is to be found in bodily feeling, 
in identification with the unbearable pain. . . . The 
metaphysical principle of the injunction that ‘Thou shalt 
not inflict pain’. . . . finds its justification only in the 
recourse to material reality, to corporeal, physical 
reality, and not to its opposite pole, the pure idea.37 
Emphasized earlier was that Hegel marks a very distinct point in 
the history of Western philosophy insofar as the paradigmatic shift 
from the philosophical assumption of totality and oneness to the 
stress upon non-identity and multiplicity is concerned. It is precisely 
this shift that we see in Adorno. Despite the preeminence of 
negation and difference in dialectics, Adorno still finds in Hegel a 
faith in totality and the one. Against a unified-totality-driven 
dialectic then, Adorno proposes a negative dialectics: the 
philosophical method and paradigm that values precisely the 
nonidentity of material existence. Adorno asserts: “It lies in the 
definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, 
as if it were total. This is its form of hope.”38 
This articulation of the sutures of philosophy finally leads us to 
Zupančič’s analysis of the fate that Hegel’s philosophy suffered in  
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophies. For Zupančič, 
the critique directed at Hegel narrows down to the impression that  
 
 
37  Ibid., 116–17. Adorno further writes: “By claiming to be an all-embracing system, 
philosophy runs the risk of ending in a series of crazy delusions. Immediately it abandons the 
claim to omniscience, however, and gives up the idea of crystallizing all truth within itself, it denies 
the whole weight of its own traditions. This is the price it must pay in exchanging its delusions for 
reality, in purging itself of crazy notions and linking reality with reason. It then loses its character 
of a self-sufficing and cogent body of justificatory proofs. Its place in society—which it would do 
well to promote and not to deny—corresponds to its own desperate need to define what, today, is 
defined by the hackneyed term of the absurd.” Theodor Adorno, The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian 
O’Connor (MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 43. 
38 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1999), 406. 




in Hegel’s speculative edifice, it seems that “everything adds up: 
there are no loose ends, no scars (‘the wounds of the spirit heal 
without scars’), no cracks.” 39  To support her point she echoes 
Freud’s fondness of quoting the last verses of a Heine poem that 
mocks the philosophical project for a unified theory of reality: 
Life and the world’s too fragmented for me! 
A German professor can give me the key. 
He puts life in order with skill magisterial, 
Builds a rational system for better or worse; 
With nightcap and dressing-gown scraps for material 
He chinks up the holes in the universe.40 
Freud describes philosophy as a form of psychosis, an Unglauben, 
which the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan interprets as “not wanting to 
know anything about the spot where truth is in question.”41 Lacan 
shares Freud’s critical attitude toward philosophy.  He directs his 
criticism to ontology and describes it as intellectually bankrupt in its 
claim to being capable of providing a “theory of everything.”42 It  
was, in fact, Lacan who revived the very term ‘antiphilosophy,’43 
declaring outright: “I rise up in revolt, so to speak, against philosophy. 
What is sure is that it is something finite and done with.”44 His  
 
 
39 Zupančič, “The Fifth Condition,” 197. 
40 Cf. Heinrich Heine, ‘The Homecoming’, LVIII, trans. Hal Draper’s, The Complete Poems of 
Heinrich Heine: A Modern English Version (Boston: Suhrkamp/Insel, 1982), 99, in Zupančič’s “The 
Fifth Condition,” 197. 
41  Cf. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 63 in Alain Badiou’s Wittgenstein’s 
Antiphilosophy, trans. Bruno Bosteels (London: Verso, 2011), 9. 
42 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Seminar XIX: …oupire, session of June 21st, 1972; Lacan, Seminar XX: 
Encore, in Adrian Johnston’s “This Philosophy Which Is Not One: Jean-Claude Milner, Alain 
Badiou, and Lacanian Antiphilosophy,” S: Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology 
Critique 3 (2010): 140. 
43 Bruno Bosteels, in his Introduction of Badiou’s Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, 6. 
44  Cf. Jacques Lacan, “Monsieur A,” Ornicar 21-22 (Summer 1980): 17, in Badiou’s 
Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, 6–7. 




antipathy to philosophy is founded on what he recognizes as the 
inability of philosophy to accept and confront the inconsistency of 
reality. He writes: 
What is the love of truth? It’s something that mocks 
the lack in being of truth. We could call this lack in 
being something else—the lack of forgetting, which 
reminds us of its existence in formations of the 
unconscious. This is nothing of the order of being, of a 
being that is in any way full.45 
 Just as for Freud, philosophy refuses to see the very 
questionability of its central concept: truth. In the eyes of Freud and 
Lacan, philosophy refuses to accept that truth itself consists in 
contradiction. In reinforcing this, the Lacanian philosopher Slavoj 
Žižek, also attributes to philosophy the discourse of the ‘master’ 
who is incapable of confronting the Real.46 Philosophy covers up 
that which resists its grand narrative.  It tries to fit the world into its  
unified system at the expense of the trace, the Other, the body, the 
unconscious, the Real, the non-identical—the very ground of 
multiplicity, the embodiment of the constitutive antagonism of  
reality. Philosophy “chinks up the hole in the universe” because it 
does not want to see that the hole is in truth what sustains the 
universe. 
Against the backdrop of all these discourses, Badiou recognizes 




45 Cf. Jacques Lacan, “The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,” The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book 
XVII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 52, in 
Badiou’s Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, 8. 
46 For further information on the ‘master’s discourse’, see Slavoj Žižek’s Plague of Fantasies; 
Looking Awry; For They Know Not What They Do; and Sublime Object of Ideology. 




two more dominant thought traditions. This sign is: “the 
monotonous repetition of the statement that the ‘systematic form’ 
of philosophy is henceforth impossible.” 47  At the core of the 
alternatives proposed by the philosophies thus enumerated, there 
seems to be a suspicion that the most that philosophy can do is 
delegate its task to the more established academic fields like science, 
politics, art, or psychoanalysis. Philosophy during this period, the 
period after Hegel, in the assessment of Badiou, “no longer knows 
whether it has a suitable place.”48 
The End of Philosophy and the Linguistic Turn 
The suturing of philosophy, however, is just one aspect of the 
problem confronting philosophy. It is not simply a question of 
being sutured to one or two or three of the more dominant 
academic practices or disciplines today. But, more alarmingly, as a 
theoretical consequence of the discourses about the inability of 
philosophy to provide a solution to what it problematizes—namely 
the question of truth and the possibility of inscribing change in the  
world49—philosophy itself, in the twentieth century, already seemed 
to believe its own death and impossibility. This sentiment is 
something that Badiou recognizes in the three dominant 
philosophical orientations of twentieth-century philosophy: the 
hermeneutic, the analytic, and the postmodern, which he discusses 
in his article “Desire of Philosophy and the Contemporary World.”50 
 
47 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 65. 
48 Ibid., 113. 
49 These two goals of philosophy, is something that could be recognized in philosophy ever 
since it began, but became most pronounced in Plato’s philosophy. 
50  Available online at http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/articles/the-desire-for-
philosophy/. This article was later on published as “Philosophy and Desire,” which served as the 
first section of his book Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, trans. and ed. Oliver 
Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 2003). 




Hermeneutic philosophy, which gained wide recognition in 
Germany, Badiou notes, is basically concerned with the 
interpretation of the meaning of Being and our being-in-the-world.51 
It focuses on the reconfiguration of the concept of understanding 
that leans more on the side of practical knowledge in contrast to 
representational knowledge. The most famous names associated 
with this orientation are Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. 
Analytic philosophy meanwhile, having gone beyond its Austrian 
origin, now dominates English and American academic philosophy. 
Badiou remarks that this current is mainly focused on the strict 
demarcation between meaningful and meaningless statements.52 It 
aims to cure us of illusions and aberrations in language and bring 
about that which is universally understandable to us. 53  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap are only two of the most well-
known names from this tradition. 
Finally, the third orientation is postmodern philosophy, which is 
mostly identified with its goal of deconstructing the ideas of totality  
and essence in speculative philosophy, the emancipatory projects of 
modernity, and the great narratives of history.54  This orientation 
asserts the irreconcilable plurality of registers and diversity of  
languages, practices, and worldviews. This orientation is most  
pronounced in France. Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois Lyotard 
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Badiou claims that, despite their differences in principle and 
theoretical framework, these three philosophical orientations in 
mainstream philosophical discourse still share something similar 
among them.55 The first one is the rather morose sentiment about 
philosophy’s death. All three signal the end of classical metaphysics. 
For Heidegger, philosophy since Plato, had been a long tradition of 
the forgottenness of the proper question that must be addressed: the 
question what does it mean to be? As has been pointed out earlier, 
in Heidegger’s diagnosis, technology is the ultimate expression of 
the destiny of metaphysics, the rational man overcoming the 
physical world. A similar sentiment could be drawn from Carnap. 
For him the impossibility of metaphysics lies in the fact that 
metaphysical utterances are devoid of meaning and cannot give 
assent to thought. 56  Wittgenstein would echo this sentiment by 
saying that “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence.” 57  Finally, we hear the pronouncement of Lyotard that 
postmodern society is characterized by the incredulity towards 
metanarratives and signals the end of grand narratives.58 These lines 
of thinking suggest that if anything must be done, it is that 
philosophy must be purified of its metaphysical residues, which is  
tantamount to saying: philosophy must abandon itself.59 Thus, in  
 
 
55 Ibid., 33–34. 
56 Carnap writes in the introduction of his essay, “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through 
Logical Analysis”: “In the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative 
theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely 
meaningless”  (Rudolf Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of 
Language,” in Erkenntnis [1932]: 60–81). 
57 Proposition 7 of  Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 89. 
58  See Jean Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (England: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
59 Coming from the articulation of Aristotle in his Metaphysics, I argue that  the attempt to 
overcome metaphysics is the very attempt of philosophy to overcome itself. 




Badiou’s diagnosis, philosophy according to the three orientations 
“has entered the perhaps interminable epoch of its closure.”60 
The second theme that the three orientations share in common is 
language being the horizon of their discourse. If Western 
philosophies of the ancient period revolved around the concept of 
Being in relation to the cosmos, if medieval philosophy cogitated on 
the philosophical ground of the idea of God and the rest of 
knowledge that ensues from it, and if modern philosophizing zeroed 
in on the liberation and progress of the human subject by way of 
human reason, contemporary philosophy is caught within the 
transcendental frame of language. 
Hermeneutic philosophy, in privileging interpretation over 
representation, asserts: “Language is the house of Being.”61 Analytic  
philosophy, in its preoccupation with the rules and laws governing 
verifiable propositions, declares: “The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world.”62  Postmodern philosophy, in deconstructing 
assumptions of unity in order to highlight the incommensurability of 
differences, argues: “In a language, in the system of language, there 
are only differences.”63 
Language, in contemporary philosophical thought, has become 
“the great historical transcendental of our times.”64 Recognizing this, 
Badiou claims that “language became the crucial site of thought  
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62 Proposition 5.6 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 68. 
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the linguistic turn meant the shift of focus from metaphysical truth 
to the multiplicity of meaning embedded in language. Later on, 
Badiou would criticize this and highlight how it falls into “linguistic 
relativism.” 
The Triumph of Finitude 
From the previous discussions, it could be surmised that the 
after-Hegel effect in philosophy constitutes three phenomena, 
namely, the suturing of philosophy to other disciplines, the end of 
philosophy, and the linguistic turn. Within these three, one 
recognizable idea that unifies them is the commitment to finitude. 
Terms like the differend of Lyotard, the ‘real’ of Lacan, the ‘non-
identical’ of Adorno, the ‘unconscious’ of Freud, the ‘infinity’ and 
‘alterity’ of Levinas, ‘facticity’ in Heidegger, Wittgenstein’s reference 
to the mystical, etc., all refer to the fact of non-totality of human 
knowledge and systems. In this essay, I situate this discourse against  
the backdrop of Kant and Hegel. The antitotalitarian tendency in 
philosophy and the consequent focus on limits, I argue, is consistent 
with the Kantian revolution in metaphysics. 
When Kant inquired into the possibility of metaphysics itself in 
his Critique of Pure Reason, the focus on the ‘objects’ of metaphysical 
inquiry shifted to the examination of the “capacity or incapacity of 
reason to make judgments about these objects.” 66  The central  
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which is infinite, but only with reason itself, and with problems which arise entirely from within 
itself, imposed not by the nature of things distinct from it, but by its own nature” (Immanuel Kant, 
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possible.”67 In line with this, he crowned Reason as the “legitimate 
court of appeal.”68 The conclusive aspect of this critico-epistemological 
turn was that in metaphysics, the proper field of “what can be 
known” had been delimited to the realm of appearances 
(phenomena) and barred from the realm of things in themselves 
(noumena). Kant argued that “we cannot have knowledge of any 
object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of 
sensible intuition, that is, an appearance.”69  Knowledge, as Kant 
understood it, is only possible with the union of understanding and 
experience; that pure reason has access only to the realm of 
phenomena. He summarizes this point in that famous phrase: 
“Thoughts without content are empty. Intuitions without concepts 
are blind.”70 Understanding cannot intuit. And senses cannot think.  
Therefore, “only from their union can knowledge arise.” 71  This 
became the central tenet of philosophizing. The finitude of human 
reason, reason within limits, had become the banner of Western 
philosophy.  
Kant’s critical philosophy won wide recognition and celebration 
in philosophy. It was not until Hegel that philosophizing took 
another interesting turn. The significant role of Hegel lies in the 
attempt to reinstitute a metaphysics that is capable of articulating a  
truth about the whole of reality—a reality that is in no way split  
between the noumenal and the phenomenal—and has as its object, 
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Truth “in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the 
Truth.”72 
In his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences Hegel writes: 
A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids 
us pause before proceeding to inquire into God or into 
the true being of things, and tells us first of all to 
examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is 
equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to 
become acquainted with the instrument, before we 
undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for 
if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be 
spent in vain.73 
In this work, Hegel emphasizes Kant’s breakthrough, but also the 
confusion involved in his project. Hegel highlighted that critical 
philosophy assumed what it ventured to inquire—“an examination  
of knowledge that can only be carried out by what is already an act 
of knowledge.”74 Hegel writes: “Unless we wish to be deceived by 
words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. . . . To examine this so-
called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to  
know before we know is absurd as the wise resolution of 
Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to  
swim.”75 In his Science of Logic, Hegel accuses Kant of “the fear of the  
object.”76 In shifting the focus of metaphysical thought from ‘its  
objects’ to ‘its limits’ and positing the inaccessibility of the noumenon,  
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Kant, in Badiou’s words, “created an even more radical 
indeterminacy than the one he denounced in classical 
metaphysics.”77 In stressing the finitude of the subject, Kant ended 
up “increasing the space of indeterminacy,”78 arguing in the end for 
the impossibility of the access of knowledge to the in-itself of reality. 
Against the backdrop of the overly cautious Kantian project, 
Hegel once more asserted the rational treatment of the existence of 
the infinite. 79  In this treatment, for Hegel, lay the strength of 
classical metaphysics. Ancient metaphysics, he writes, has 
 . . . . a higher conception of thinking than is current 
today. . . . This metaphysics believed that thinking (and 
its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, 
but rather is its essential nature, . . . and that thinking in 
its immanent determinations and the true nature of 
things form one and the same content.80 
It must be noted though that Hegel was not proposing a return 
to classical metaphysics per se. He was only after reviving the faith  
that classical metaphysics had in the possibility of thinking and 
knowing what Kant was so afraid of: the noumenon. Indeed, Hegel 
unabashedly asserted how classical metaphysics had been  
“extirpated root and branch” 81  after the Kantian critique of 
metaphysics. Hegel pursued the logic of the Kantian revolution but  
he was able to see beyond Kant. Hegel proclaimed that the core  
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consequence of the critique is the affirmation of the possibility of 
knowledge, but without the remainder of the thing-in-itself—the 
affirmation of the possibility of knowing “absolutely” with nothing 
left behind. Hegel declared absolute knowing under the banner of 
dialectics. 
In explaining the revolution of Hegel, Badiou writes, 
Dialectical argument, as a courageous argument, . . .  
attempts to put an end at the same time both to the 
objectivity of the undetermined in classical metaphysics 
and to the subjective finitude which, in critical archi-
metaphysics, stands alone before the undetermined 
absolute. Essentially, dialectical argument poses that a 
category of thought is only such on condition that it 
exhausts without remainder that which is thought in 
thought through this category. Or, to quote Hegel, if 
the category remains a form of absolute thought, there  
cannot also be the surplus of “a thing-in-itself, something 
alien and external to thought.” When all is said and 
done, argument, to quote Hegel again: “demands that 
the forms of pure thought be considered not with any 
such limitation and reference but as they are in their 
own proper character, as logic, as pure reason.”82 
For Hegel, what guarantees knowledge as absolute knowing is 
basically that thought, perseveres to “work out the solution to its 
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independence.”83 On Badiou’s interpretation, this means “Not only, 
and contrary to what Hamlet declares, is there nothing in the world 
which exceeds our philosophical capacity, but there is nothing in our 
philosophical capacity which could not come to be in the reality of 
the world.”84 Being absolutely exhausts itself in thought. 
This had radical consequences to Western philosophizing. The 
confidence in being able to articulate reality in its entirety—having 
the “absoluteness of the concept and the creative freedom of 
negation” 85  as its justification—became the central target of the 
political, positivist, psychoanalytic, and aesthetic critiques of 
philosophy that ensued after Hegel. The declaration of the end of 
metaphysics itself coincided with these critiques of philosophy. In 
the eyes of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, and 
Lyotard, Hegel’s attempt to revive the rational-systematic discourse 
of the infinite proved to be thoroughly ludicrous. After what 
totalitarianism brought to the consciousness of humankind, any 
philosophical system that placed itself in the service of totality, the 
transcendent, or the metaphysical was abandoned. 
Since then, philosophy has become preoccupied with language 
and the finitude of the understanding. Metaphysics is seen to be  
impossible because something always slips from cognition, because 
something unavoidably resists representation and symbolization. 
Formalization always comes up against an impasse. The name for  
this resistance is the trace, the Other, the differend, the nonidentical, 
the mystical, or the real. That language is the lawful space of thought 
is drawn from the claim that thought only happens in and through 
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language. 86  But as such, language is incapable of articulating the 
fullness of reality. Thought, as being possible only within the great 
transcendental condition of language, is always limited only to that 
which “can be said,”  “to the world as it is,” and thus, to the world 
as constituted by differences—differences that make totality or the 
philosophical “system” itself an impossibility. 
This was the landscape that gave birth to Badiou’s first Manifesto 
for Philosophy and the monumental work Being and Event. As I have 
pointed out, twenty years later, philosophy was confronted by the 
phenomenon of its over existence in the form of widespread 
pronouncements about morality and ethics. In his Second Manifesto for 
Philosophy, Badiou argues that after the linguistic turn, an ethical shift 
followed. I have referred to this double shift earlier as the ethico-
linguistic turn. Under the ethico-linguistic turn, the primacy given to 
finitude still holds; its main imperative is the nontotalization of the 
Other. For this reason I am still linking the ethical turn to the after- 
Hegel effect in philosophy. It is still consistent with a philosophy of 
finitude. In his Second Manifesto for Philosophy Badiou writes: 
A Manifesto always comprises an ‘it is time to say’ that 
blurs any distinction between what it says and when it says 
it. What authorizes me, then, to judge that a  
Manifesto for philosophy is on the agenda, and a second 
Manifesto at that? What is thinking in our times?87 
Since the ‘new philosophers’ and the collapse of socialist 
states, only the most elementary form of moralizing  
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preaching qualifies any longer as ‘philosophy.’ All 
situations are assessed in terms of the moral conduct of 
their actors, with the number of deaths being the sole 
yardstick for political endeavors and the fight against 
the ‘bad guys’ the unique ‘Good’ possible to be put 
forward.88 
Badiou recognized that after the failure of twentieth-century 
political revolutions, “communitarian passions have expanded to fill 
the void left by the collapse of any viable universalist political 
project.” 89  The consequence was a “post-totalitarian ‘repentance’ 
and liberal respect for human rights.” 90  It resulted in a strong 
opposition against anything that violates what is referred to as our 
most inalienable rights, viz., our “rights not to be offended or 
mistreated with respect to one’s life (the horrors of murder and 
execution), one’s body (the horrors of torture, cruelty, and famine), 
or one’s cultural identity (the horrors of the humiliation of women, 
of minorities, etc.).”91 It turned out that contemporary philosophy 
was not only a battle against the totalitarianism of metaphysics, but 
also a battle against totalitarian politics. 
Henceforth, philosophical inquiry resolved to own up to the 
finitude of its pronouncements. What exist now are plurality and 
perspectivism. At the level of ontology and metaphysics, 
contemporary philosophy argues that something resists  
total conception or total exhaustion in language. At the level of  
epistemology, the mind has a limit, it is incapable of accessing that  
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which resists it. At the level of ethics, the resistant principle is the  
Other (Levinas), the body (Adorno), or the subject (Lacan) itself.  
The shift in philosophy consisted not only in the shift from truth to 
meaning, but also in the shift from metaphysics to ethics; the core of 
these shifts is the turning from the metaphysical to the finite. 
The Challenges of the Contemporary World  
and the (Re)turn of Philosophy 
After the ethico-linguistic turn and the triumph of finitude, 
philosophy has taken the task of contemplating the possibility of the 
good life that revolves around the core value of recognizing and 
respecting diversity in the social world. 92  However, in the  
assessment of Badiou, a philosophy centered on finitude is incapable 
of confronting the challenges and demands of the world. Badiou 
asserts that contemporary philosophy is incapable of affirming the 
four desires of philosophy: revolt, logic, universality, and risk.93 
According to Badiou, these four-dimensional desires characterize 
philosophy itself. Philosophy asserts itself through these desires,  
without these desires, philosophy would not be philosophy at all.  
Within the dimension of revolt, Badiou argues that “there is no  
philosophy without the discontent of thinking in its confrontation  
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with the world as it is.”94 At the same time, philosophy is also logic,  
because it never gives up its “belief in the power of argument and  
reason.” 95  Furthermore, philosophy always delivers itself in a 
universal address to humanity insofar as “it supposes that all 
humans think.”96  Finally, this universal address in the form of a 
logical revolt is always a risk: “thinking” for Badiou, “is always a 
decision which supports independent points of view.”97 
Badiou recognizes that contemporary philosophy cannot pursue 
or sustain these four desires. For him contemporary philosophizing 
is too compatible with the world as it is. He cites four principal 
characteristics of today’s world, which, in his diagnosis, are what 
obstruct the very desires of philosophy. 
The first of these is today’s world being ruled by merchandise. 
Philosophy’s desire for revolt is obstructed by the standardization 
and commercialization of the stakes of freedom. 98  The world 
declares itself free, but the free use of this freedom has already been  
coded into the system of monetary and product circulation. At the 
end of the day, no action can really be done if one is penniless. It 
has become an accepted fact of life that you would be lying to 
yourself if you were to say that you can actually do something  
without money. Even in the academe, projects, researches, and  
conferences are all dependent on the availability of funding. 99 
Money is human agency’s gate pass to the free market.100 
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Next to the reign of merchandise is the reign of communication, 
which challenges the desire of philosophy for logic. For Badiou, the 
phenomenon of mass communication promotes incoherence and 
illogicism. It presents the world as a world of disconnected images 
and a spectacle devoid of memory, as new images and remarks are 
continuously produced, negating the very images and remarks that 
have just been shown and said.101 
Furthermore, the world for Badiou has been fragmented by the 
specialization of skills and functions.102 This for him poses a threat  
to philosophy’s desire for universality. It is becoming more and 
more difficult to think and come up with a solution, in a universal 
sense, to the problems we are faced with locally or globally, as  
diversity and divisions proliferate. In matters of radical cultural  
differences, it almost seems as if there were no common grounds to 
which we could appeal when dealing, for instance, with religious 
fundamentalists on one side, and liberal democracy on the other. 
Finally, in Badiou’s eyes, the world is obsessed with security.  
Everything is being calculated and subjected to statistics. No one is 
willing to take risky decisions and risky commitments anymore, or  
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to submit one’s existence to the perils of chance.103  It could no  
longer be denied how more and more books about predictive 
analysis referring to success rates for certain courses of actions are 
being published today. Even love is subjected to calculation as 
dating sites, where people could check grounds for compatibility 
and likeability beforehand, are becoming widespread—a promotion 
of love without the fall. Polls have taken over the ‘voice of the 
people.’ And with this, people are increasingly becoming fearful and 
ill-equipped to risk the right response when faced with events and 
circumstances that evade these calculations. 
With these four characteristics of the contemporary world, the 
desires of philosophy are obstructed at all fronts. Badiou notes that 
it is precisely because of this that the (re)turn of philosophy is 
needed. This call for the (re)turn of philosophy could be understood 
on three fronts: the metaphysical, the epistemological, and the 
ethical. 
At the level of metaphysics, if what qualifies the end of 
metaphysics as legitimate is its inability to account for the  
impossibility of ‘the excess’ to be inscribed in a systematic theory, 
Badiou in a Hegelian spirit, counters the Lacanian claim that “the 
real is the impasse of formalization” by stating that “formalization is  
the impasse of the real.”104 In embodying the power of metaphysics  
to determine the indeterminable, Badiou is positive as regards the 
possibility of metaphysics becoming a science that does away with 
the Kantian fear of the object. The undetermined infinite, for 
Badiou, can be inscribed in theory as had been made possible in 
mathematics, particularly in set theory. This claim is the centrifugal  
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thesis that organizes Badiou’s monumental work Being and Event. 
What philosophy needs, for Badiou, is to reconstruct an ontology 
that can really account for the character of reality as ‘pure 
multiplicity.’ This is something that Badiou recognizes as one of the 
great revelations of capitalism, “the pure multiple became the 
ground of presentation that denounces every effect of One”105: the 
replacement of the authority of One, with the authority of the 
multiple. It could be said, that Badiou here is asserting the power 
and flexibility of rational discourse in reconstructing itself as it 
confronts the truths of contemporary time. Furthermore, Badiou 
sees the impossibility of totality as a wake-up call for ontology’s 
transformation rather than its dismissal. 
It is this reconstruction of ontology which anchors Badiou’s next 
steps for the (re)turn of philosophy. The reconstruction of ontology 
is not simply to configure into theory the infinite or the 
indeterminable, but it is only needed in order to make possible the 
thinking of the central category that for him remains to be the 
object of philosophizing since Plato and Aristotle: the category of  
truth. For Badiou, it is this central concept which is capable of 
overcoming the limitations presented by the epistemological-ethical 
discourse on finitude and differences. Insofar as ontology is  
concerned with the science of pure multiplicity, Badiou opens Being  
and Event with the claim that the true philosophical question now is 
the possibility of a universal and singular truth that would itself 
transcend finitude and diversity. This is Badiou’s philosophical 
project. To reinstitute the possibility of truth occurring in the world 
otherwise governed by differences. For Badiou, it does not require 
so much thinking to assert that there are differences among us. He 
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remarks that there should be no reason to “respect or vilipend”106 
differences in the first place. That our life as human animals consists 
of particularities is the law of things.107  “Infinite alterity is quite 
simply what there is.” 108  What calls for a more difficult  
thinking is the idea of the same: the thought of what could be 
universal that is capable of transcending our differences because 
what it inscribes is something valid for all thinking. 
This is Badiou’s response to the linguistic and ethical shifts in 
philosophy. As regards the discourse on language in epistemology, 
Badiou follows the lead of Plato in the Cratylus that “philosophers 
do not take as point of departure words, but things.”109 He writes: 
If philosophy is essentially a meditation on language, it 
will not succeed in removing the obstacle that the 
specialization and fragmentation of the world opposes 
to universality. . . .  If the category of truth is ignored, if  
we never confront anything but the polyvalence of 
meaning, then philosophy will never assume the 
challenge that is put to it by a world subordinated to  
the merchandising of money and information. . . . We  
are subjected to the media's inconsistency of images 
and commentaries. What can be opposed to that? I do 
not think that anything can be opposed to it except the 
patient search for at least one truth, without which the 
essential illogicism of media communication will 
impose what we might call its temporal carnival. . . .  
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Philosophy requires that we throw the dice against the 
obsession for security, that we interrupt the calculus of 
life determined by this obsession. . . . I believe it is vain 
to imagine that, in the absence of a principle of truth, 
one can oppose to the calculus of life an existential 
gamble, which will give rise to something that can be 
called a liberty.110 
Badiou forwards an understanding of truth as essentially 
disruptive of common opinion and knowledge. Truth for him is that 
which “punches a hole  in knowledges.”111  For Badiou, it is the 
revival of the concept of truth which is capable of embodying the 
four desires of philosophy for universality, revolt, logic, and risk. It 
is under this banner that he argues for the necessity of philosophy in 
today’s world. The contemporary situation of humanity’s obsession 
with security discourages risk and incapacitates man from being 
open and equipped with the courage to face events that escape  
his calculations. At the same time, the reign of mass communication 
and “the most highly regarded freedom of today: the freedom of 
opinion,”112 both surrender thought to the realm of opinion and  
simply sustain incoherence. Furthermore, within the great spectacle  
of merchandise, humanity is reduced to the capitalist anthropology 
that we are self-interested animals who only need to be served with 
ever new products. Finally, the moral injunction of the tolerance of 
differences which is now turning into a multiculturalist ideology 
sustains fragmentation and steps back from the challenge of finding 
what might be considered universal or transversal that is valid for all  
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thinking.113 Whether it is in the realm of art, politics, science, or 
love, the question of race, gender, religion, class, or age, for Badiou, 
should not be a problem, they do not even count. One can love, 
solve a scientific problem, create a work of art, fight for justice, 
while eating what one is used to eat, wearing anything one wants or 
traditionally wears, praying to a deity or God or not praying at all. 
Within these human endeavors in the fields of art, science, politics, 
and love, the domain of particularity is halted. It is these kinds of 
human undertaking which basically transcend the brute fact of 
finitude, mortality, and diversity, and are capable of embodying the 
true life. 
Badiou saw the critical status of philosophy in relation to the 
contemporary world and thus called for its (re)turn: 
That it be today possible, and so necessary to desuture 
philosophy and proclaim its renaissance; that, following 
the long suspension entailed by the successive and 
ruinous privileges of the scientific condition  
(positivisms), the political condition (marxisms), and 
the poetic condition (from Nietzsche till today), the  
imperative is once again to configure the four  
conditions starting from an entirely recast doctrine of  
truth; that, at odds with the repeated announcements of 
the ‘end of philosophy,’ the ‘end of metaphysics,’ the 
‘crisis of reason,’ the ‘deconstruction of the subject,’ 
the task is to resume the thread of modern reason, to 
take one more step in the lineage of the ‘Cartesian 
meditation. . . . ’114 
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There is no doubt that philosophy is ill . . . It is 
suffering in my opinion from linguistic relativism, from 
being entangled in the problematic of the disparity of 
meanings, and it is also suffering from historical 
pessimism including about itself. My hypothesis is that 
although philosophy is ill, it is less ill than it thinks it is, 
less ill than it says it is. . . . And I think that it is so, 
because the world itself, despite all the negative 
characteristics and pressures it exerts on the desire of 
philosophy, the world, that is the people who live in it 
and think in it, this world is asking something of 
philosophy.115 
The call for the (re)turn of philosophy for Badiou finds its 
motivation in the fact that for him, the world requires it. He cites 
four specific reasons for this. The first is that, “we now know that 
there is no chance that the human sciences will replace  
philosophy.” 116  The human sciences, he says, have “become the 
home of the statistical sciences.”117 The numerical information that  
they provide is incapable of accounting what truly matters for the  
singularity of human beings. The second reason is that “we are 
witnessing the ruin of the great collective enterprises that we once 
imagined carried within themselves the seeds of emancipation and 
truth.” 118  The failure of emancipatory politics gave birth to an 
extreme level of calculative attitude that gradually killed the spirit of 












intervention. The third reason is the rise of “contemporary figures 
of irrational archaism”119 among certain cultural, religious, national, 
or racial groups. Such reactive communitarian passions, Badiou 
argues, must be confronted by a pronouncement about 
contemporary rationality, a way of doing things that does not give 
up on the power of being able to think things through regardless of 
how difficult it is to come up with an agreeable course of action. 
And fourth, the need for philosophy arises from the need to have a 
framework open to the possibility of singular and disruptive events.  
Badiou argues that our current ethical ideology is incapable of 
fortifying in us in our confrontation with the world. It does not help 
us confront the question of how we are to act in the wake of events 
that disrupt the very coordinates of the world that we ‘know’. It is 
because of this incapability that Badiou advances a new 
understanding of ethics. It is an ethics that does not give up on the 
desires of revolt, logic, universality, and risk, which are capable of 
encouraging us to inscribe change and a point of interruption to the 
world as it is. It is an ethics that bridges the gap between “the world 
as it is,” and, “the world as we desire it to be.”120 
In that case, I would argue that philosophy giving up on itself is 
tantamount to giving up on the world itself. For Badiou, the role of  
philosophy is to make “a diagnosis of the epoch,” “a construction, 
on the basis of this contemporary proposition, of a concept of 
truth,” and, “an existential experience relative to the true life.”121 Its 
principal value is to give insight on the Good life, that is, on how 
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one is to have “an intense and dignified life that cannot be reduced 
to strict animal parameters?”122 
Conclusion 
In the last analysis, Badiou’s response to the antiphilosophical 
discourses that ensued during the contemporary period is that, 
simply, in the very critique that they launch against philosophy, they 
assert the relevance of philosophy. In his appreciation of Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, and Lacan, the three major antiphilosophers of the 
contemporary period, Badiou remarks: 
There is in anti-philosophy a movement of putting 
itself to death, or of silencing itself, so that something 
imperative may be bequeathed to philosophy. Anti-
philosophy is always what, at its very extremes, states 
the new duty of philosophy, or its new possibility in the 
figure of a new duty. I think of Nietzsche’s madness, of 
Wittgenstein’s strange labyrinth, of Lacan’s final  
muteness. In all three cases anti-philosophy takes the 
form of a legacy. It bequeathes something beyond itself 
to the very thing that it is fighting against. Philosophy is 
always the heir to anti-philosophy.123 
In Badiou’s perspective, philosophy must learn from 
antiphilosophy instead of giving up on itself. Antiphilosophy for 
Badiou is there to wake up philosophy from its stagnation. As a 
thought of its time, philosophizing must always see its relation to  
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the contemporary world and look for the possibility of providing a 
way through what it declares to be the impasses of thinking and 
action. 
In an article entitled, “Metaphysics and the Critique of 
Metpahysics,” Badiou asserts that “philosophy does not dedicate 
itself to the care of the limits, but to the care of the unlimited.”124 
This philosophical disposition was something already very apparent 
in Plato’s philosophy, and which Hegel himself did not fail to 
recognize. After Kant, Hegel tried to bring this attitude back to 
philosophy. And like Plato, Hegel rallied behind the idea of truth. 
Looking at the development philosophy underwent after Hegel and 
after the world wars, Badiou could not accept that the period for a 
philosophy oriented toward truth and the infinite had ended. If 
contemporary philosophizing is a philosophizing meant to be cured 
of Platonism and Hegelianism, that is, to be cured of truth125, it is 
precisely against this claim that philosophy for Badiou, must reassert 
itself. For him, the world never really offers anything other than the  
temptation to yield. 126  Hallward argues, “philosophy, when and  
where it exists, is as a matter of course in essential conflict with  
the world.”127 And for Badiou, there is only one reason for this—
that quite simply, “philosophy is in the world only to change it.”128 
If Hegel saw promise in classical metaphysics and tried to 
reconstruct it, Badiou saw and did the same. If Hegel wanted to be 
done with the finitude of human knowledge using the promise of 
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for and possibility of philosophy once again. Finally, if Hegel wanted 
to have as its object of inquiry, the concept of truth, Badiou affirms 
this and reconfigures it according to the demands of the 
contemporary world. If changing the world is the goal of 
philosophy, for Badiou, it can only do this through the return of the 
concept of truth. As with Hegel, truth was never only an 
epistemological question for Badiou. Whenever he talks about truth 
Badiou always refers to the true life—the life that since Socrates is 
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